They don’t really go into the worm as a weapon in cyber warfare but instead focus on the intermingling of networks. One of the points they don’t mention is that even if the networks don’t mingle and operational/navigational networks aren’t directly at risk, this threat still saps resources from those networks as IT staff scramble to regain control of the administration networks.

There is also the sneakernet to be considered. USB drives (which conficker leverages) can travel from one network to the other and deliver worms through that vector. Usually in classified networks USB drives are forbidden but if you miss restricting them on even one machine, the users will find it and exploit it, not necessarily intending to be malicious but for convenience.

Granted, this worm attack wouldn’t be a tactical win if it were a part of cyber warfare but it would certainly serve a purpose in propaganda, by demonstrating that even an aircraft carrier’s network and more importantly the Ministry of Defense network has weaknesses to be easily exploited.

Either way, obviously there is a level of incompetence somewhere in there.